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4ABSTRACT
In this paper, we attempt at an analysis of the political economy of
the Indian power sector with special reference to Kerala in the light of a
generic model of the political economy of public utilities we develop in
the first part of the paper. The model seeks to explain the political
economy of the rent seeking drives in a non-Smithian imperfect regime
of self-interest maximisation, with a regulatory structure of the public
utility described in a framework of the principal-agent relationship. In
contrast to the usual neo-classical monolithic representation of principal
and agent, we characterise each entity in a Marxian-Kaleckian vein, as a
composite set of conflicting sectional interests. This helps us develop a
comprehensive perspective of the politico-economic implications of the
relationship among the public, government and utility.
Based on this generic model, we seek to analyse, in the second
part of the paper, the political economy of the power sector in India,
with emphasis on Kerala.  We also attempt, wherever possible, to estimate
the costs of corruption involved in the administration of the power sector.
JEL Classification: E11, H10, H4, L94, N4, P16
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5[The Jury acquitted Clodius of the charge of
 violating the rites of Bona Dea,
wherein Cicero had given evidence against the alibi
Clodius had set up.]
 “The Jury” sneered Clodius, “did not give you credit on your oath.”
“Yes,” retorted Cicero, “25 out of the 56 did;
 the remaining 31 refused credit, for they took the bribe in advance!”
-  quoted in Thakur (1979:166).
Introduction
In most countries, intervention by governments in the economic
sphere finds its justification on mainly two fronts: (i) to correct market
failures in the provision of public goods and in the presence of
externalities and natural monopoly, and (ii) to ensure the translation of
the lofty ideal of a ‘welfare State’. Often a convergence of the two fronts
is sought to be achieved, as in India, in the establishment of a public
sector in a particular historical context. It is argued in a simple neo-
classical framework that if the benefits of productive efficiency outweighs
the costs of allocative inefficiency, then the society will have a welfare
gain from maintaining the natural monopoly organisation of a public
utility.  Furthermore, if such monopoly power (price) can be brought
down to a competitive level, say by means of its nationalisation, then
there will be both an equity gain and an efficiency gain. This is the theory.
However, the practice could be very different from the theory, as is often
the case. For example, the vast scope for administering discretionary
powers by the political and bureaucratic control processes involves
6substantial costs of rent-seeking activities in a non-Smithian cultural
regime of self-interest maximisation.1   In the non-Marxian (more
precisely neo-classical) representation of political process, the
relationships among the public, government and utility may be aptly
analysed in the light of a model of principal-agent problem. The problem
consists in the default and breach of trust, likely on account of the
conflicting objectives of self-interest maximisation of the concerned
parties and the uncertainty or information asymmetry involved in the
relationship. In contrast to the usual neo-classical monolithic
characterisation of the principal and the agent(s), a kind of Marxian
structuring of each of the entities (especially the principal, the ruling
class) in terms of composite sets of sectional rent seeking interests in the
functional domains (of agriculture, industry, trade, and labour) may yield
more insights into the relationships. These different sub-sets in the
principal set vie with each other in appropriating the benefits of the utility,
through their representatives in political power. The very same agents of
diverse interests, on the other hand, strive to stand as a cohesive group
to ensure the long run end of both the continuity of their own regime and
the survival of the system, while catering to the short-term contingencies
of clashing sub-class interests. The long-term common agenda of
capitalist survival in turn requires pacifying class strains, the general
cause of crises. And this could be ensured in general by way of a
captivating welfare State slogan, sought to be materialised in terms of
State intervention and nationalisation. Such drives often went to the extent
of equating nationalisation with socialism; and the political process was
projected to be managed by ‘representative governments’. Such
‘intermediate regimes’ (to use the Kaleckian term) were in fact an
instrument for securing the class interests of capitalist empowerment,
by ensuring both economic development and social security equations,
true to the professed welfare State slogans.
7The apparent fall of socialism and its emulations elsewhere has,
however, opened up an impressive interpretation of the viability of
economics: that there is no alternative to the capitalist mode of general
welfare. Thus has started the new notion of liberalisation-based world
welfare to sweep across the countries, replacing nationalisation by private
sectorisation as a now seemingly viable stratagem in a historical necessity
of capitalist survival. In the new dispensation of the on-going realignment
of sub-class interests in India as elsewhere, the industrial and trade
interests have risen to assert themselves.  And in the political economy,
corruption has scaled new heights in the implementation of privatisation
drives, in addition to the old transactions in awarding concessions and
contracts.
In what follows, we discuss these aspects in the context of the
development of the Indian power sector. While the provocation for this
paper arose out of our just concluded study of the power sector in Kerala,
the discussion of its political economy here is firmly set in the national
context. Though the reference to Kerala experience is largely illustrative,
there is a significant dimension to it. In the development literature, Kerala
is now well known for its remarkable achievements in human
development despite low income, reflecting the continuing inability of
the state to translate the social development into commensurate economic
development. What the discussion in this paper points out is that the
political economy of government intervention in Kerala in the economic
sector (as opposed to such social sectors as school education and health
care) is not very different from that in most other parts of India.
The following discussion is divided into three parts. In the first
part, we present a generic analysis of the political economy of public
utilities in a new synthetic methodological framework. The present stage
in the development of history is interpreted in a Marxian perspective as
8characterised by a series of seemingly feasible capitalist survival
strategies. The class character of the State, on the other hand, is found
more or less to obey the Kaleckian proposition of the ‘intermediate
regime’, but largely dictated by the currently viable alignment of the
sub-class interests in the common capitalist class. And in the
superstructure of political economy of regulation, a neo-classical
theorisation of rent seeking drives in an imperfectly co-ordinated domain
of self-interest maximisation within a principal-agent relationship
framework is adopted to obtain more insights. Such a synthetic analysis
appears to provide a comprehensive and consistent explanation of the
issues under study.
Leaning on this generic background, the second part discusses the
plausible implications in the political economy of the Indian power sector,
with special reference to Kerala. An attempt has also been made to
estimate, wherever possible, the costs of corruption involved in the
administration of this public utility in terms of the purely avoidable but
allowed cost escalation. Finally, the third part gives our concluding
remarks.
I
A Generic Analysis
The economic theory of public choice runs in the justification
of market failure in the provision of public goods and in the presence of
externalities and natural monopoly.  Where market fails in the absence
of preferences revelation, the political process steps in to obtain such
revelation; ballot voting replaces rupee voting. Consumers as voters find
it in their interest to vote such that the political outcome approximates
their own preferences and choices. Such voting on collective tax and
expenditure decisions reveals their choices in the determination of
9provisions of goods and services that price system cannot supply. Tax
functions as a price here.
The natural monopoly problem
Our concern centres on the market failure (and the subsequent
political intervention) from the existence of natural monopoly.
Traditionally, public utilities (such as gas, electricity, telephone, water,
cable TV and waste treatment facilities) are defined in terms of the
technical features giving rise to natural monopoly position. A natural
monopoly used to be interpreted as a single product, decreasing cost
industry.2   However, most utilities are multi-product: electric utilities
distribute high and low voltage power as well as peak and off-peak power,
telephone industries provide local as well as long-distance call facilities,
etc. In this context, a natural monopoly is defined under the cost
conditions when ‘the cost of a sum of any m output vectors is less than
the sum of the costs of producing them separately’ (Baumol 1977: 809).3
If this condition is satisfied, then the least cost method of producing the
whole vectors of output is with a single firm. Hence the natural monopoly
position.
Electric utility is unique in that its product is non-storable and
must be generated and supplied the moment it is demanded. This technical
characteristic in turn makes the industry essentially a vertically integrated
monopoly with the co-ordination of all the three basic functional
processes of generation (production), transmission (transportation to
markets) and distribution (supply to final users) for reaping the full
advantages of an integrated network system. This in turn gives rise to
economies of scale and the resultant natural monopoly status.
The natural monopoly justification (in terms of productive
efficiency) has however the danger of violating  allocative efficiency
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criterion, as prices are set above marginal cost (MC). Ensuring allocative
efficiency requires competition in the market that drives price down to
MC. But too many firms flooding the market leads to productive
inefficiency. This in turn opens up the fundamental problem of public
utility economics, as to the choice of an appropriate institutional
arrangement of governance structure that can manage to make use of
these economies, but without the excesses of monopoly power, creating
dead weight loss.  The practical solutions to this problem were originally
addressed in terms of two kinds of government intervention:  (i) outright
nationalisation (state monopoly) as in most of the developing countries,
France and the UK till the end of the eighties; and (ii) regulation of the
private monopoly as in most of the USA, where the former is considered
an anathema.
The significance of nationalisation appears obviously
overwhelming, once we recognise  the  scale economies associated with
a public utility and accept the consequent natural monopoly position of
it. This is easy to show, following Williamson (1968), in terms of a simple
neo-classical  analysis  of  a  trade off between market power and scale
economies. In Fig. 1, a natural monopoly, enjoying scale economies, is
shown to be able to supply at a lower average cost ACm than a
competitive, or more realistically, an oligopoly, utility at an average cost
of ACc. If, under such conditions, the cost savings, given by the rectangle
PcBDE,  exceed  the dead  weight loss  in  consumer  surplus due to the
monopoly price (Pm), given by the triangle ABC, there will be a welfare
gain from accepting the monopoly organisation of the utility. If, by
nationalising the public utility, the monopoly power can be eliminated
and the price reduced to the competitive (or oligopolistic) level of Pc,
then there would be both an equity gain and an efficiency gain, in addition
to  profit.     Nationalisation  still involves possibilities of further price
reductions and increased gains. As we will see below, the significance
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of such public sectorisation is further fulfilled in materialising a welfare
State.
Private interest theories
Market economic theory of political intervention presupposes a
demand for and a supply of it (Stigler 1971); a collective demand for
government intervention to reduce the abuse of monopoly power leads
to an appropriately chosen institutional structure for governance of
monopoly. Broadly, two strains of themes have permeated the theoretical
discourses of political economists in this regard: ‘public interest’ and
‘private interest’ theories. In the public interest framework, the social
choice manifests itself in a political process that seeks to protect public
interest or, more precisely, to maximise social welfare through an
appropriate regulatory mechanism.
On the other extreme is a large spectrum of private interest theories
of manifold hues and shades. Here the mechanism of political process
Figure 1. Benefits of the monopoly organisation of electric utility and
its nationalisation
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presents itself as the manifestation of the combined effect of rent seeking
activities of various interest groups. Paralleling homo economicus, we
have here homo civicus – the agents are assumed to be rational in their
choices in utility maximisation. The interest groups seek to improve their
own wellbeing by capturing and manipulating the administrative channels
of the State’s resources of coercive power. The behaviour of legislators
is determined by their desire to stay on in power and hence legislation is
designed to maximise their political support. Since legislation involves
redistribution of wealth among the subjects, interest groups compete to
capture government by offering political support in exchange for
favourable legislation4  (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976).
Bureaucracy, the administrative agency of the government to
implement its policies, as an interest group to capture the government
also is considered. It is assumed that this organisation’s production is
not sold in the market place (Downs 1967) or equivalently, not sold at
per unit prices, such that the compensation of the bureaucrats does not
depend upon the success of the organisation, defined in terms of  surplus
of revenue over cost (Niskanen 1971; 1973). Hence it is in the interests
of the bureaucrats to seek to maximise their own utility. They are capable,
because of the one-sided advantage of better information they possess,
of capturing their superiors (the politicians in power) to obtain budgets
larger than those normally granted by the politicians in government if
they were properly informed.
In another viewpoint, government itself is assumed to be a
monopoly, treated as a leviathan maximising its own surplus (Buchanan
1975: Ch. 9). This involves a systematic bias in the fiscal system resulting
in an over-expansion in the budget, born of the self-interested bureaucrats
(Niscanen 1971) and politicians in power (Mackay and Weaver 1978),
seeking to maximise their budgets so as to gain in income, influence or
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power, and to have larger staffs and perquisites. On the other end of this
theoretical band is a view that takes governments as ‘inhabited by self-
interested individuals’, i.e., as composite structures, instead of a
monolithic one: ‘…these centres compete with one another in the
production and supply of the goods and services demanded by citizens’
(Breton 1996: 13-17).
The very raison d’etre of self-interest prompted pressure groups
is warranted by the fact that government intervention causes income
redistribution through legislation, and that public policies in general are
just the response to the rent seeking activities5  of private interest groups
trying to change income redistribution in their favour. Rent seeking
appears in the context of a contrived monopoly rent – a monopoly
artificially created by imposing restrictions on potential competitors.
Competition for the contrived monopoly rents in effect transfer them to
the politicians in power who manage to create the monopoly by restricting
potential competition through legislation. The lure of this power involving
a rent from monopoly a la government in turn is the source of competition
among politicians, i.e., rent seeking activities by them. Similarly,
bureaucracy, the executive agency of the government, also enjoys
monopoly rents; hence rent seeking among prospective candidates to
reach and secure powerful positions in the hierarchy (for example,
excessive expenditures on (special) education to prepare and on other
arrangements for civil service examinations: Tullock 1980).
The principal-agent problem
An important contribution to the study of regulatory behaviour
comes from the focus on the significance of information especially in a
principal-agent relationship framework. In its simplest form of a vertical
relationship, government, representing the public, is seen as the principal
and the utility as the agent in its employ or under its authority. In an
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extended form, (e.g., of a three-tier hierarchy) the public stand as principal
and government (regulator) as agent (i.e., supervisor) who contracts with
a further agent, the public utility, to supply the vector of services. In its
barest terms it is assumed that in a regulatory governance structure, the
principal’s objective is to maximise some measure of social welfare,
while the agent (utility) aims to maximise profit. Information asymmetry
against the principal explains the raison d’etre of the agent who is better
informed or better skilled. The divergence in objectives and the
uncertainty or information asymmetry result in two effects6 : moral hazard
(principal being affected by ‘hidden actions’ by agent) and adverse
selection (principal being affected by ‘hidden information’ agent has at
his command) (Arrow 1985). Hence the principal should structure his
contract (compensation scheme) with such incentive designs as to
encourage the agent to expend the expected effort that will compensate
the information asymmetry the principal faces in his maximisation
objective.7
A new look into the principal-agent problem
These neo-classical teleological representations of the political
process underscores the positions of the players (people and government
including politicians and bureaucracy) in distinct, disjoint, sets, ‘external’
to each other. Such ‘externalisation’ of the government from the people
becomes sharper in a Marxist framework of the functional role of State.
Where the society is divided into classes and sub-classes, clashes of
self-interests inevitably lead to demoralisation and alienation. Feelings
of alienation permeate the whole texture of consciousness, individual
and social, and this in fact explains all the cases of indiscipline in
functionings and insincerity in responsibility and the consequent stress
out of the mistrust that underlie the principal-agent problem. Neo-classical
analysis, as is its wont, never turns its microscopic eye-piece to these
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fundamental strains. This is equally capable of explaining the much bitter
experiences of alienation under the very ‘socialist’ regimes, where the
agent, entrusted with the task of ensuring the ‘dictatorship of the
proletariat’ remained entirely ‘external’ to and above the principal, the
proletariat.  A lack of a sense of oneness led to a principal - agent problem,
much sharper in the void of a civic platform of checks and balances, that
would have avoided problems arising from moral hazards and adverse
selection. This should point towards the significance of an all-embracing
cultural revolution preceding the political take over of the State.
A critical examination and exposition of the principal-agent model
in this light in the context of an Indian-type public utility is in order
now. In contrast to the usual monolithic characterisation of principal
and agent(s), we find these entities as composite sets of sectional interests.
The State being the objectification of the common capitalist class
interests, this ruling class, at this particular historical juncture, stands as
the principal. In actual realisation, however, the common interests have
only long-run significance, if at all possible, in the face of the short-run
contingencies of intense conflicts of intra-class interests (competition
being a widely used euphemism) in the capture of the benefits of the
efforts of its agent, the utility, through the supervisor, the government.
The sub-sets in the common capitalist class represent the industrial,
agricultural and commercial interests, aided by their own peripheral allies
in the organised labour.  It is not easy for the supervisor to wade through
the chaos of such inter-/intra-class interests clashes. The politicians, who
wield the State power qua government, have their own primary objectives
of interests also, viz., their own survival and continuity in power,
overcoming all the ruses of the rivals, to secure the long-run accumulation
of the attendant  benefits. This very objective in turn relies heavily on
indulging the interests of the influential vote banks. In a predominantly
rural economy, such as in India, large vote premiums are easily cornered
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by being in league with the farming capitalists, who can herd at their
beck and call vast ballot blocks. This then explains the much pampered
practice of holding the umbrella of subsidy policy over the agriculture
sector in these countries; for example, the free or near free supply of
power.  This then becomes an easy option as compared with what we
would like to call a developmental option through a policy of capital
formation in the rural sector by way of an effective investment strategy
(e.g., development of land and water resources), leading to structural
transformation and growth of the rural economy.
Such milking of a public utility by a section of the
composite set of the principal is at the cost of the others in the set.
Cross-subsidisation constitutes a source of tension among the sub-
classes of the principal and the consequent feelings of alienation.
The supervisor i.e. the government, however, is able to buy peace
by appeasing, through subsidised power sales, all these sections
together, including the allies in the organised labour, in their capacity
as domestic customers. Cross subsidisation in this respect is
extended at the cost of some sections of the population; the net
losers in this game, however, are the poor (non-electrified
households). And the role of the State as a coercive instrument for
exploitation is fully fulfilled here. This conclusion still holds even
if we enlarge the major set of principal to encompass ‘the whole
public’, in contrast to the above Marxist proposition.  In this case
the supervisor colludes with the beneficiary section of the principal
and milks the public utility for them at the cost of the remaining
poor, who are seldom in a position to exercise their choice of ballot
use independently. The supervisor requires such conditions only.
Such actions of the supervisor are often given a veil of legitimacy
through a notional subsidy offered to the weaker sections such as
small farmers and rural households.
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Nationalisation to fulfil the welfare State
Both the early experience of the erstwhile Soviet Union as well as
the influence of Keynesian economics gave nationalisation pride of place
in State policy such that it soon came to be equated with socialism. The
whole of Western Europe was swept over by a wave of nationalisation
immediately after World War II, that set a precedent to a large number of
countries elsewhere. Politically, such a ‘socialism through legislation’,
in contrast to socialisation, was in fact a response and a counter to the
socialistic (more precisely, quasi socialistic) conversion of Eastern Europe
under the extended military umbrella of the then Soviet Union, though
temporarily. It should be noted that these East European countries
economically at best represented a symbiosis of plan and market, as
envisaged by the European liberal socialists such as Oskar Lange and
Maurice Dobb and this lent nationalisation in other countries an equal
footing with socialism to the satisfaction of their elite proletariat and
intelligentsia.8
The neo-classical theorisation of political process, while
overlooking these undercurrents, was, however, confined to analysing
their reflections on the surface. Thus the public sectorisation and the
welfare State practices were explained (e.g., Mishra 1984) in terms of a
number of forces that cumulated to exert an upward ‘ratchet’ effect on
welfare programmes and expenditures such as political competition for
votes, lack of cost constraints on voters’ behaviour due to the low salience
of taxes, pressure of interest groups outside the State, notably trade unions
and professionals, and the operation of budget maximising [politicians
and] bureaucracies within the State.
In this background it was then natural for the developing countries,
most of them rising from the colonial subjugation, to mould their
independent economic life in the same fold of a welfare State. There
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was an added factor covertly accepted that too necessitated State control
of economics in these countries – the lack of a developed capital market
and the supply of entrepreneurs in the domestic private sector. Implied
in this official recognition was a hidden agenda of treating the public
sector as a temporary midwife for the development of private sector,
and history has proved this later on. India has been one of the pioneers
along this U-path.
The ‘intermediate regimes’
What is the specific class character of the State that works behind
this U-path development strategy?
The class that rose to power in many underdeveloped countries
upon Independence after the World War II was identified by Kalecki
(1967) as the ‘intermediate class; (that is between the capitalists and the
workers), or more specifically, the lower-middle class and rich peasantry’.
A few specific conditions facilitated such an ‘intermediate dictatorship’,
in contrast to the dictatorship of bourgeoisie and of proletariat. For one
thing, the lower-middle class was ‘very numerous’, and the ‘big business’,
comparatively weak and ‘predominantly foreign controlled’ (ibid.). This
ensured the rise to power of the representatives of the intermediate class
without being captured by the big business as was usual. For their survival
in power, they sought to eliminate the ‘comprodor’ elements (i.e., to
‘gain a measure of independence from foreign capital’), as well as the
‘remnants of the feudal system’ (the latter by carrying out land reforms,
meant to weaken the alliance of the big business with the landlords).
This in turn necessitated ‘continuous economic growth’. Since ‘the native
upper middle class’ was too weak ‘to perform the role of ‘dynamic
entrepreneurs’ on a large scale’, the State came forward with the basic
investment for economic development, in line with the universally
accepted principle of ‘State economic interventionism’ of that era.
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Another favourable condition was the availability of credit finance for
economic development. The intermediate regimes, taking advantage of
the competition between the first (advanced capitalist) and second
(socialist) worlds, behaved like ‘the proverbial clever calves that suck
two cows’.
In this context it was in the interest of the intermediate class to
promote economic development through the commanding position of
the public sector.  Ideally, ‘State capitalism concentrates investment on
the expansion of the productive potential of the country’, that provides a
luxuriant atmosphere for the small firms (of the ruling class) to thrive,
without fear of concentration and centralisation of capital, under the
watchful patronage of the State. The consequent economic growth opens
up more and more avenues of employment ‘for ambitious young men of
the numerous ruling class’. Such a sustainable growth dynamics in turn
is logically to materialise a welfare State, put up as the end of the
intermediate regime.
As interpreted by Raj (1973), the historical reality has however
failed the Kaleckian ideal of dynamic State entrepreneurship, thanks
solely to the conflicting self-interests of the numerous classes and their
fringe allies in the ruling coalition. Political survival has entailed
indulging the demands of some or other classes for subsidised supply of
State sector outputs, resulting in accruing very little investible surplus
or incurring losses. Moreover, the government also has been meant to
support and cater to the pecuniary demands of ‘a large and growing
body of salary earners whose contribution to economic growth may be
negligible’ involving ‘further drain on the investible surpluses available
to the State’. Thus even though the intermediate regime was politically
viable, its survival has been at the expense of the economic viability of
its dynamic entrepreneurship.
20
The subsequent developments out of such fabricated
dysfunctioning of the public sector in the intermediate regimes, leading
in another conducive global environment to private sectorisation, offer
a number of implications. Most basically, we find that the new order has
facilitated the growth of the native upper-middle class (into independent
big business), and the expansion of the small firms. Some of the lower-
middle class and rich peasantry (the latter through diversification) also
have been able to climb up to higher rungs of the capitalist echelon. It
goes without saying that mergers and concentration have largely
characterised the development of capital in these regimes, along with a
peaceful coexistence by small capital too. Thus the intermediate regime
had a hidden agenda in line with the rule of development of capital. This
was so at least in the case of India, where, as Kalecki (1967) himself
admits, big business, at the time of Independence, ‘was much stronger’,
and could dictate its terms too. Simply put, intermediate regime was an
explicit agreement among different, both small and big, strata of the
capitalist class in alliance with organised labour for facilitating the
survival and development of capitalism. Though the numerical strength
of the intermediate class elevated its representatives to power, some live
strings still attached them to both the extremes – big business and labour.
Once the native capitalism has matured into imperialism (that exports
capital in contrast to commodities), it along with the global capital in an
environment of coexistence has now become able to capture the
intermediate regime and to reinstate ‘classical capitalism’ (envisaged as
possible by Kalecki 1967). This explains the U-turn strategy.
II
The Indian Power Sector
The welfare State concept had its fervent devotees in India too. If
Gandhiji talked of ‘Ramarajya’, then Nehru talked of a ‘socialistic
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society’. Both the Congress Party and the splinter groups of social
democrats talked of nothing else. The coexistence of market and plan
continued to be the official economic principle of Independent India
under the Congress, along with an import substitution model of
development for building a strong industrial base, both for basic and
intermediate goods and for heavy machine building. And the famous
1955 (60th) Avadi session of the Congress party adopted a ‘socialistic
pattern of society’ for India, through planning, ‘where the principal means
of production are under social ownership or control, production is
progressively speeded up and there is equitable distribution of the national
wealth’ (from the Resolution, quoted in Zaidi and Zaidi 1981: 52).
Following  this guideline, the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 shifted
the primary responsibility for development on the public sector and
demarcated and reserved the core and strategic areas exclusively for the
State.
In intermediate regimes the State machinery has had to
indulge not only the sectional interests of very numerous classes,
but also those of the very class representatives (as an external
set) wielding power. Nationalisation, for example in India, was
at times more a profitable political agenda (in addition to an
additional outlet of rent seeking) than an economically viable
requirement. As in the case of other infrastructure facilities with
high capital intensity and long gestation period, that deterred
large scale initiative of private enterprise, the responsibility of
power development also was thus originally shouldered by the
State in India. The sector, rightly expected to subserve the social,
political and economic policies of the State, soon became in effect
the translatory channel for the populist policies of the political
party in power in the various provincial states in the pursuit of
votes.
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Ilfare of the electric utility
In such a context of composite interests, accumulation of
dysfunctionings has been a natural outcome in the power sector. For one
thing, subsidised power, in the name of swift industrialisation, has gone
to turn the factory machines, at the behest of the capitalists, who could,
say, finance election campaigns. The true price, however, of such
industrialisation drive, for example, in Kerala, was very high, as most of
the industries sprung up in the state under the subsidy umbrella were
capital- and energy-intensive, with very limited prospects for creating
employment opportunities, one of the professed objectives of the drive
(Kannan and Pillai 2001).9  Highly pampered by the subsidised power
sale also are the domestic customers, the influential section among the
electorate.  By seventies the logic of power subsidy was also extended
to the agricultural sector to placate the powerful lobby of rich farmers.
As already noted, the fact that in general the non-electrified households
and fragmented farms belong to the poorest of the society questions the
justification of the welfare content of such across the board subsidy to
the  powerful groups.
The appeasement strategy on the part of the supervisor
(government) in favour of the influential section of the principal (the
public in general) has a downstream extension also towards the
bureaucracy of the agent (the public utility). This is especially ensured
by the powerful trade unions, the loyal affiliates of one or another of the
supervisor, and hence the collusion is a given fact. The appeasement
appears more prominently in overmanning, especially and unwarrantedly
in establishment and administration (E & A), in a populist bid of
employment generation. The consequent increase in E & A costs stands
in turn to inflate the supply costs of electricity and penalises directly the
customers and further indirectly the poor tax payers. In Kerala, such
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collusion has had increased effect, as we already noted in an earlier paper
(ibid.), not only on the extent of overmanning, but also on the average
annual earning per employee, which was Rs. 1.44 lakhs in 1997-98,
about 1.8 times the state-sector average in India. That is, the cost of such
collusion was about 80 per cent higher in the power sector of Kerala
with a highly militant labour.
Alignments of sectional interests
We have enlarged much upon the effects of the various sectional
interests in the composite set of principal vis-à-vis a monolithic
supervisor. That electricity supply is included in the concurrent list of
the Constitution in India renders the supervisor also a major set of
sectional interests, those of the Central as well as of the regional state.
Such a regional distinction of the interests of the supervisor has assumed
greater significance only recently, in the context of the accelerated Central
drives for power sector restructuring in India, as there was little scope
for conflict of interests till the end of 1980s. The power sector reform
programmes in the version of the Central government are not at all
acceptable to many of the state governments, at least for the populist
slogans against any restructuring of the sacrosanct public sector. In fact,
it is in view of such conflict of regional interests in the functionings of
the supervisor, that proposals are floated now for transferring electricity
supply to the Central list in the Constitution.10   The Electricity Bill –
2000 may be taken as a first big leap towards that direction.
It is not surprising to find, in the present phase of the capitalist
survival strategy, that what underlies the Central government prescription
of power sector restructuring is a realignment of sectional self-interests.
The vociferous demand and stringent stipulation by the Central
government for phasing out the subsidy regime altogether is a clear
indication of this. The domestic industrial capital in league with the global
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capital is in the process of capturing the supervisory organ of the State.
In the power sector, the proposed restructuring absolutely favours the
industrial capital – besides the benefits from the removal of the burden
of cross-subsidisation, it can also reap cheap power upon marginal cost
pricing practice, as supply to high voltage industries involves much less
T & D network costs and loss factor costs than that to low voltage
domestic and rural sectors. Putting an end to the costly subsidised power
sale might appear as an attractive proposition of reason and justice on
the surface, as it breaks the unfair nexus between the supervisor and the
rich rural lobby. Though it seems desirable from that viewpoint, the
process, however, would have long-run detrimental distributional effects
as far as the public development issues are concerned, as we will see
later on. Moreover, the new configuration of collusion must also arouse
a natural doubt as to the rationality of the supervisor relinquishing his
sure rural vote base. But the much impressive TINA (There Is No
Alternative) factor involved in the reform proposals, coupled with the
diverse vote purchase mechanisms is expected to safely take care of this
problem.
The corruption channels: energy theft
Along with the force of vote-premium aligns high-powered
corruption. As the bureaucracy (of the public utility) enters, the scene
gets complicated with implications of collusion of different
configurations. One major combination is among the Board officials and
erring customers, enjoying political patronage, for uninterrupted theft
of power flagrantly practised, for example, in the very capital city of the
country. Corruption greases a smooth relationship here, so long as its
cost (bribery, in-kind transfer, favouritism) remains less than the value
of power drawn behind the meter. The effect of collusion transcends the
direct end of transfer and spreads in the whole functional veins of the
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Board; it credits, without verifying the authenticity of its own procedures,
the power thus lost, to the farm sector, where consumption is mostly
unmetered.  As we have already found (ibid.), about 30 to 40 per cent of
what is usually reported as agricultural power consumption in fact
represents power lost in such illegal ‘sale’. Then assuming, quite
reasonably, that the actual agricultural consumption is only 65 per cent
of the reported one, we have already estimated that in 1997-98, the energy
thieved away in connivance with all the State Electricity Boards (SEBs)
amounted at least to 31073 MU, equivalent to Rs. 5733 crores, at a sales
rate of Rs. 1.85 per unit! This, though an underestimate, gives in effect
an annual cost of corruption at only one (i.e., sale) end in the Indian
power sector.
A further heroic assumption here is that the reported T&D loss is
the actual one, a good part of which in fact is ‘theft and dacoity loss’.
Thus the actual value of corruption at the sales end must be much higher
than our rough estimate. For example, with the assumption of an actual
15 per cent T&D loss in 1997-98 (including technical and inefficiency
loss due to inadequate transmission capacity), the total cost of corruption
at the sales end in the Indian power sector comes out to be a staggering
Rs. 10705 crores!11  In the case of Kerala power sector, where agricultural
power consumption is mostly metered and accounts for only about 4 per
cent, such illegal ‘sale’ of power is included directly in the T&D loss.
Assuming an actual 15 per cent T&D loss in 1997-98 in Kerala against
the reported 17.9 per cent, we find that the cost of such corruption amounts
to Rs. 33.7 crores.12
A more sophisticated way of ‘theft’ is to get the officials to allow
huge energy bills to mount up and then to write them off as ‘bad debts’.13
In our study mentioned earlier we have seen that the revenue arrears
outstanding against different consumers for all SEBs in 1996-97 was
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Rs. 11,535 crores, accounting for over four months’ sales revenue, against
the maximum allowable norm of two months’ sales revenue. The excess
of outstandings over the admissible norm may then be taken as an
approximate measure of the cost of corruption involved at this end of
energy ‘theft’ in the form of deliberate non-payment by customers of
electricity charges in connivance with the officials. This amounted in
1996-97 to Rs. 4220 crores, equivalent, as we have estimated earlier, to
the additional revenue at hand if all the SEBs could limit their revenue
arrears to two months’ sales norm, and in 1995-96, to Rs. 7364 crores!
In Kerala, corruption on this front cost Rs. 175 crores in 1995-96, and
Rs. 198 crores and Rs. 252 crores in the next two years! The ‘bad debts’
written off during these three years by the KSEB were Rs. 11.8 crores,
Rs. 12.5 crores, and Rs. 14.8 crores respectively.
Corruption at the high up
The government (i.e., the political party in power) also falls within
the collusion circle to the extent that it condones such theft without
striking its coercive authority properly, lest that ruin the other ‘side
contracts’ it has with the erring Board and customers. The government
seeks not only to maximise its vote base to secure its survivability through
populist administration in the best interests of the capitalist State, but
also to gain income for its individual coalition partners. Ministry
formation is in fact a ‘rent-sharing’ side contract in proportion to the
bargaining strength expressed at the time of reaching the  coalition
contract. Every ministry or department has its own illegal inlet of income
or ‘sale counter’ for the concerned minister and his coterie; thus industrial
concessions are sold at a price; so is a new college or liquor shop licence.
In the power and irrigation sectors, construction contracts and purchase
orders are conferred at a price.14  By the ‘side contract’ of collusion, the
Board bureaucracy may share in the price along with its supervisor, the
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particular ministry in the government, or gain other favours of larger
budgets.
There have come up a number of allegations of corruption involving
ministers15  and bureaucracy in the Kerala power sector. Some of them
have recently been convicted also. For example, a former Minister along
with his power secretary and some top officials of the KSEB were
convicted in a case involving award of construction contract.16  There
have been allegations of corruption against other power minister(s) in
recent times too; for example, on the contract with the Bharat Heavy
Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) in the case of Kozhikode and Kasargode diesel
power plants, and with a Canadian firm in the case of an extension scheme
(Kuttiady hydro-power  project). The infamous Kannur-Ennore episode
is another apt case in point here.17
Purchase of materials and machinery, especially power generating
equipment, involves large scale corruption, the scope of which has
widened since 1992 (post liberalisation period) with the stipulation for
bilateral credit options that necessarily involves purchases from foreign
equipment suppliers, as bilateral credit is inevitably tied.18   An Enquiry
Commission in Kerala has indicted another former power minister and
his officials in the case relating to financial irregularities, involving a
loss to the KSEB of Rs. 75 crores in the award of contracts in the case of
the Brahmapuram diesel power plant; a vigilance probe is in progress
into this case.19   At national level, the infamous Jain hawala revelations
have indicted a large number of Central government officials, about half
of them being from the power sector  – the NHPC (Dulhasti project) and
the NTPC (many bilaterally funded projects) actively involved.20
Wide-spectrum corruption
As ‘rents’ increase, the bandwidth of collusion also widens to
include the contractors and the trade unions, in addition to the government
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and its agent. An apt example of such ‘wide spectrum collusion’ is the
large corruption involved in allowing for time overruns of projects and
sanctioning the associated cost escalations. Recurring unrestricted labour
militancy is recognised in general as the single factor that puts the heaviest
burden on the pace of the construction works of power projects in Kerala,
largely dictated by party-political rivalry rather than genuine labour
demands, as for example, in the construction of Idukki hydro-electric
project, to begin with. The time overruns out of the striking militancy
upon one or another pecuniary pretext essentially go into the contractors’
demand for cost escalation, that is soon endorsed by the Board and
sanctioned by the government.21   Such rent (extortion)-sharing is a widely
recognised official practice in the power-irrigation sectors. The glaring
laxity on the part of the government in fulfilling its committed
responsibility for enforcing its authority on the contractors and workers
to bind them within the contractual terms they agreed to take up to honour
is a clear indication of its corrupt collusion. In Kerala, the time and cost
overruns have afflicted only the state power projects; the public sector
NTPC thermal and the private sector hydro projects in the state having
been completed well within their scheduled times. In this light, then, the
cost escalation sanctioned for each late-run project may rightly be taken
to represent the cost of corruption involved in construction contract sales
in the power sector of the state. Accounting for the general price inflation
during the normal construction period, this amounts to Rs. 6374 crores
or Rs. 354 crores per project!22  Unbelievably, it represents on an average
about 60 per cent of the actual project cost! In some cases it is well
above 75 per cent.  This is all shared among the four parties involved, at
the cost of the helpless majority in the ‘principal’ set of tax payers.
At the top of these ‘milky’ projects is an extension project (Kuttiady
hydropower project phase 1, works on which started in 1994),23  with a
corruption cost of nearly 80 per cent of the actual project cost. In this
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case, it should be noted that so much capital cost inflation was allowed
by the government not for a new project, but on an extension project for
50 MW only! A new hydropower project as per current estimates is
expected to cost around Rs. 2.5 crores per MW, whereas this extension
project has cost Rs. 3.96 crores per MW! (Government of Kerala 2000).
The contractor for the project, SNC Lavalin International Inc., a Canadian
firm, has been involved in a number of controversies and a corruption
case against them is under vigilance probe at present. It is worth
mentioning that even while being under the clouds of a corruption case,
the very same foreign contractor was awarded the modernisation works
of 3 old hydropower plants, viz., Pallivasal, Panniar and Sengulam, and
that too through a MoU only, without calling for international tenders as
per guidelines! Current estimates put the costs of such modernisation
works at Rs. 1.25 crores per MW, whereas the contract to SNC was
given at a cost of Rs. 2.42 crores a MW (Rs. 280.5 crores for 115.5 MW
of the three plants) (Malayala Manorama daily 7 February 2001).
Assuming the validity of these estimates, a new hydro-plant of more
than 110 MW could be constructed at this cost!
Corruption-inflated capital costs
Corruption lodged in inflated costs of power projects24  is not an
India-specific phenomenon, though allegedly materialised since the entry
of Enron. The Dabhol power project of Enron has cost about US$ 2830
million (US$ 1.4 million per MW) as compared with a cost of US$ 1200
million (US$ 0.64 million per MW) for a similar plant, the 1875 MW
Teesside project of Enron in England, (Mehta 2000: 98) i.e., more than
twice! This works out to be Rs. 4.48 crores per MW, much higher than
the NTPC’s 645 MW gas-based Kawas project (implemented in
November 1993 at Rs. 2.32 crores a MW), which comes in effect to Rs.
3.56 crores per MW only at an assumed inflation rate of 10 per cent by
30
March 1997 (Morris 1996: fn.2). The National Working Group on Power
Sector (1994: 14, table 5.3), a motley organisation of left economists,
trade unionists and former heads of SEBs,  has shown in a detailed study
that an Indian alternative combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plant will
cost only Rs. 3.05 crores per MW and a coal-based one, much costlier
than a gas-based plant, Rs. 3.13 crores per MW only. The calculations of
the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) have put the total capital costs
of an Enron-type plant at Rs. 1.91 crores a MW (December 1997
completed costs). However, the Ministry of Power (MoP) has, since the
Enron entry, been justifying higher capital costs of power projects in
India; for instance, while the CEA has estimated the cost of the
Bakreshwar thermal plant at Rs. 2.91 crores per MW, the MoP has put it
at Rs. 4.36 crores per MW.25  The ministry has, moreover, put out a list
of projects with final costs of Rs. 4 crores to Rs. 5 crores per MW, and
has thus sought to justify clearing private sector projects costing Rs.
3.28 crores to Rs. 5.09 crores a MW (The Economic Times (editorial) 22
March 1994).
The projects in Kerala too have become heavily loaded with inflated
capital costs, as shown above. The very high capital costs allowed to
SNC Lavalin by the government through a MoU only in the case of both
Kuttiady extension (phase 1) and the Pallivasal-Panniar-Sengulam
modernisation schemes should now be compared with the capital costs
quoted in an international tender bidding for Kuttiady extension phase 2
project. Among the four companies left in the fray, the lowest bid has
come from a consortium of two Indian companies  (L&T – BHEL) at
Rs. 164 crores, while the highest from the SNC Lavalin at Rs. 324.4
crores! (Malayala Manorama daily 7 February 2001).  It should be noted
that the Board’s own estimated capital cost for the project, recognised
by the government itself, is Rs. 220.5 crores, i.e., Rs. 2.21 crores per
MW! The 1991 project report of the KSEB has estimated the cost of
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machinery at Rs. 170 crores, while BHEL has promised, in its letter to
the chief engineer on 2 February 1998, to supply the items at Rs. 51.5
crores! In terms of machinery cost itself thus there is a gain of Rs. 118.5
crores, more than worth another two sets of machinery, in addition to the
obvious benefits of encouraging indigenous production and supply.
Corruption bursting
Corruption remains untraceable if the bond of collusion is sticky
and stable. The probability of its disclosure or detection is a function of
the ‘incentive’ a participant has to confess or to report. Though it may
look unlikely, the benefit of being approver inviting less penalties or a
vindictive tactics, both possible in a prisoners’ dilemma framework, may
induce a party.26  But the more potent tool rests with a government itself
for digging out, if it wills, evidences of corruption engaged in by the
previous rival government – the old files and records with the ministry
and the Board would speak volumes for the dubious circumstances27  the
then authorities created for possible corruption. It was in this manner, as
already explained, the active roles of two former power ministers in
Kerala in large scale corruption could be brought into light by judicial
enquiry commissions. Though characterised as an unscrupulous
vindictive move to ‘finish the rival’, such competitive exhumation, set
in eruption in Indian politics recently, in place of the earlier tacit collusive
condonation, is in fact a welcome sign. Such much needed competition
between governments, in line with competition in the economic sphere
induced by liberalisation that is assumed to do away with unfair practices,
can act as a powerful deterrent to corruption, by filling the rivals with a
fear that exhumation might lead to political extinction, though it can
also lead to ingenious ways to whet efficiency in corruption practices.
At the same time, this involves dangers of a deliberate kill, as a
government, through its coercive power, can ‘create’ evidences of
corruption against a rival for its short-term gains.
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 It should, however, be added here that the too-slow pacing of the
Indian judicature along with its multi-tiered appeal-provision hierarchy28
sets the convicts free in effect and leaves the system, more often than
not, farcically ineffective as a deterrent to corruption as well as crime.
Moreover, corruption bursting a la exhumation will not work, if
the new government finds scope for rent-extraction from and further
rent sharing with the briber-contractor of the previous regime; the need
to protect the briber protects the previous bribee too. The active presence
of SNC Lavalin in the Kerala power sector even now despite a vigilance
case against it is a case in point. SNC came to Kerala on 2 April 1993 as
consultant to a hydropower project (Lower Periyar) upon the instructions
of the World Bank, the loaner to the project. Sickened at the prolonging
time overrun of this project, the Bank stopped its assistance and quit the
scene in December 1994, which should have in effect automatically
terminated the contract with SNC. However, it was reported that the
technical and finance members of the KSEB, without waiting for the
full Board decision, extended the contract and paid SNC US$ 43 lakhs
against the World Bank recommended payment of US$ 30 lakhs. A
vigilance probe was ordered later on into this financial irregularity that
had caused a loss of US$ 13 lakhs to the Board. But the new government
also was soon ‘captured’ by SNC, as evidenced by the later developments
of fresh contracts ‘procurements’ by them – Kuttiady extension and
Pallivasal-Panniar-Sengulam modernisation projects. And the vigilance
probe moves at its legendary snail’s pace, now having covered more
than four years of no result!
Private Sectorisation
It is common knowledge that  the strong waves of liberalisation
started to sweep across the world along with the fall of socialism. Public
sectorisation had given capitalism a new lease  of life in the face of
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threats from a flourishing socialism. But the disintegration of the socialist
bloc, the raging discontent that resulted in massive popular uprisings
against the (quasi) socialist regimes in the Eastern Europe and the costly
inefficiency of unaccountability that characterised the public sector in
general were all detracting from the vitality of socialist slogans and had
the makings of a new twist which the stagnant history badly needed.
The capitalist survival now required a new strategy of global expansion,
facilitated by a variant of laissez faire. The Thatcherite drives of private
sectorisation in the UK, projected under a colourful TINA banner, and
the deregulation bids in the US were powerful political over-fishing in
the troubled water of a vacuum of reliable pro-people alternative. In this
powerful sweep, the public sector in India, that was apparently qualified
as having fallen from the ‘commanding heights’ to the ‘demanding depths’
of inefficiency, too was soon marked for market. Conveniently concealed
in this hasty decision making were the obvious evidences of the socio-
economic development India had been able to achieve through the
‘commanding’ distributive channel of a public sector.29  The official
machinery was only keen to magnify the dark specks of avoidable
functional inefficiency of a number of public sector enterprises (PSEs)
in a concerted bid to justify privatisation. Even an influential section of
the informed atmosphere of India appeared alarmed over the apparent
low productivity of the public sector (for example, Bhagwati 1993),
without caring for locating its sources for possible cures, and the
functional inefficiency, still avoidable or easily curable, was identified
with structural/organisational deviations. This made it easier to reach a
foregone conclusion in favour of restructuring. Thus, starting with the
sixth Plan (in the early 1980s), private sectorisation in India got the full
thrust at the cost of public sector with the eighth Plan in the era of
liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation, the new form of the cyclical
survival tactics of the capital.
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Corruption in privatisation
In addition to major contracts and concessions, liberalisation has
opened up another avenue of corruption, that is, privatisation. This has
been the single largest route of payments that has pushed the transition
economies (the countries of the former Soviet Union) to the highest level
of corruption in the world.30   China too is not an exception in this respect
of its reform drives.31  An explanation of corruption in transition views
privatisation and liberalisation as market oriented reforms that allow
rent seeking and corrupt practices to proliferate. Corruption in transition
is the result in particular of the incipient nature of restraining legal and
other regulatory institutions (see e.g., Weisskopf 1992). However, this
ahistorical explanations, ignoring the roots of corruption (the Czarist
Russia was one of the most corrupt nations, Massie 1980) fails to reflect
upon the conditions in the transition economies in the period immediately
before and during the break down of the socialist system that acted as an
ideal medium for the growth of ‘monetary corruption’. The New
Institutional Economics views corruption in transition as a continuum
from the past, thus recognising the legacy of corruption under the socialist
system. Since institutional changes occur slowly and incrementally,
history may be taken as a predictor of the continuing patterns of corruption
during the transition (Feige 1997). Though historical path dependency
is an important framework of explanation of corruption, the experiences
of the transition economies had an immense and immediate (‘big bang’)
onset of political and institutional changes that were by no means
evolutionary nor incremental. The changes imposed through ex cathedra
proclamations in fact disregarded the need for a conscious development
of a rule of law to substitute, while unleashing the reins of order of the
old regime. And the resultant chaos filled the vacuum with full corruption.
The transition in India on both the occasions (of initial public
sectorisation and the later liberalisation) was however within the confines
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(of a modicum) of rule of law.32  But the historical path dependency of
corruption still stuck in the inevitable loopholes of rules.33  Unlike the
Western industrialised nations, India (and other developing countries)
could not pass through a character-smelting cultural revolution in the
progressive phase of the development of capitalism. Just as colonialism
in these countries had found it profitable to prop up the corrupt cultural
vestiges of the old feudal system, so did capitalism too. Thus corruption
continued as if determined by a historical necessity for the State.
In the initial period of moulding a socialistic pattern of society
under a sacrosanct planning system in India, almost every economic
activity had some contact with control and regulation. Where control
and regulation were tighter and grew in complexity, political and
bureaucratic discretion in administering controls naturally involved an
increasing scope for rent seeking (Government of India 1964: 7-8).
Though Gunnar Myrdal (1968: 942-943) believed ‘on the basis of scanty
evidence’ that India, ‘where a moralistic attitude is especially apparent’,
might ‘…on the balance, be judged to have somewhat less corruption
than any other country in South Asia’, Santhanam Committee (on
Prevention of Corruption 1964) found corruption as an increasing
function of economic controls in the Indian planning system.34   Krueger
(1974), who formalised the notion of rent seeking, estimated  the annual
welfare costs of rent seeking on account of price and quantity controls in
India to be about 7.3 per cent of the national income of 1964, ‘judged
large relative to India’s problems in attempting to raise her savings rate.’
(p.294). Following the same ‘procedure of approximating rent seeking
costs by the value of rents created by controls’ in the external sector,
capital market, goods market (including agriculture) and labour market,
Mohammad and Whalley (1984) however found the cost of rent seeking
to be approximately 30 to 45 per cent of the national income in 1980-81.
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To the extent that politicisation of economic activities through
control regimes results in vast scope for corruption, its antidote is sought
in depoliticisation. Thus liberalisation, while putting an end to
administrative discretion35  of control raj over the private sector in
principle closes down the associated avenues of corruption too. Where
control is over ownership rights (the State sector), depoliticisation of
economic activities entails privatisation, i.e., conversion of control rights,
involving discretionary political and official actions, into private, market-
driven choices, supposedly free of corruption. But an important question,
not at all addressed in this respect is: are the benefits from elimination of
costs of control rights greater than the costs of profit-driven private
choices? Here we concur with the liberal socialists who would still say:
‘Officials subject to democratic control seem preferable to private
corporation executives who practically are responsible to nobody.’ (Lange
and Taylor 1938: 109-110).   This is especially so in a country like India
where the private sector is characterised by an absence of transparency
in its functioning, let alone that of its susceptibility to social control.
The infamous dysfunctionings of the capital market with the
corresponding predatory behaviour of its actors lends sufficient credence
to such a view.
Privatisation, transfer of control rights, is expected to reduce
corruption, but the privatisation transaction itself can be corrupt in the
same way as in the award of concessions and contracts. The prospective
buyers may vie and pay for getting included on the list of pre-qualified
bidders as well as for restricting the number of other bidders. Rose-
Ackerman (1999: 35-38) illustrates three more corrupt practices in this
respect. (1) In the absence of a scientific method of valuation of assets
of the state enterprise marked for privatisation, the uncertainties of the
process can facilitate scope for insider plays. The favoured buyer can
easily procure information not available to others, or much earlier or
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reserve special treatment in the bidding process. He can even get the
assessment process corrupted in his favour by having assessors of his
choice get the bid and do the work. (2) With no assets evaluation criterion
to rule, corrupt officials can under-value a state enterprise in return for
pay off. The firm may be presented as unhealthy and its prospects, feeble
such that the favoured buyer can outbid others. (3) The prospective buyers
would be keen and ready to pay more to retain whatever monopoly power
was available to the State firm. ‘To an impecunious State and its bidders,
assuring monopoly power is in the interests of both. Thus the conflict
between revenue maximisation and market competition arises for all
privatisation deals. If a State gives lip service to competitive principles,
however, it may be unable to endorse monopolisation openly. Corrupt
back-channel deals can then accomplish that objective…’(ibid.: 37).
Privatisation of electricity sector in the Indian context is obviously
ominous of disaster. The assets of SEBs are highly under-valued; the
gloomy presentation of a sick SEB would further cut into its value.
Howsoever professedly meticulous the assets valuation rule(s),
privatisation would thus amount to a cheap sell-out. The very high
corruption potential would just add to this woe. The whole assets,
accumulated by two generations of tax payers over a period of half-a-
century, would thus be lost for a one-time paltry payment to the then
government to squander.
Moreover, privatisation of the electric utility necessarily involves
the problem of retention of monopoly power of some degree, as history
amply shows. Manzetti (1999) argues, among other cases, that the
privatisation of electricity industry in Chile involved such (unfair) deals
that could generate monopoly rents for the winners.  For another example,
the two major generators in the English electricity supply industry, viz.,
National Power and PowerGen, had enjoyed sufficient market power in
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the Pool to raise prices and make supernormal profits (Green 1999).
Rent seeking costs, related to such monopoly power retention processes,
as explained earlier, are necessarily accommodated in higher market
prices. In the English electricity supply industry too , as elsewhere, the
increased cost was passed on to small consumers (ibid.).
The drive for power sector reform in India has been opening up a
vast field for corruption in which the international lenders too have  been
eager to claim their stakes. Such experience comes with its rude shock
from Orissa itself where the World Bank has been a major party to
misappropriate and squander  a good part of its structural adjustment
loan to the state in the name of consultancy fee, service charges, and so
on (see box  1). The Government has been forced to opt for foreign
firms, instead of capable indigenous firms, as consultants in the reform
programme, in violation of guidelines.  Crores of rupees have been
drained away into the consultants’ coffers, of course with a part of it re-
channelled  into some domestic pockets also. The same is the case in
almost all the states, whether or  not  the  Government  in  power  is  keen
on  implementing  any  reforms  at  all. Even in Kerala, that is dead
against the so-called power sector reforms, there have been much heated
allegations of corruption in respect of appointing a Canadian firm (SNC
Lavalin) as consultants on ‘power sector reform-related policy matters’.
Yet another disastrous consequences comes from the fact that a
private enterprise system necessarily works on exclusion principle. The
vast scope for lodging all sorts of large scale rent seeking costs in over-
capitalisation stands pretty well to inflate supply costs that can exclude
a sizeable proportion of consumers with limited purchasing power. Higher
incidence of exclusion would be one of the deleterious social costs of
private sectorisation in a poor country like ours, leading to increasing or
excessive inequality, both individual and regional. As argued by Galbraith
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(1998), though in another context, the process, beyond a certain
indefinable threshold, may become cumulative and unstable, and is likely
to result in a loss of community and social coherence. And all this is in
addition to the wasteful expenditures and transfer of resources. Moreover,
such capital cost inflation confounds the very problem (viz., allocative
inefficiency) presumably intended to be solved through privatisation.
There is no TINA force!
As nationalisation of natural monopoly ensures both productive
as well as allocative efficiency and equity, a vertically integrated
monopoly organisation of electric utility in the public sector remains a
foregone conclusion. However, an atmosphere of warring sectional
interests out to capture benefits along with a conducive regulatory policy
of populism has contributed to a mismanagement syndrome in the case
of most of the SEBs (Kannan and Pillai 2001). Their functional
inadequacies and financial infirmities, though entirely avoidable, have
come in handy for a mis-characterisation of the whole sector: the costly
dysfunctionings are unreasonably identified with economic inefficiency,
which in turn is associated with the standard notion of some market
structure devoid of competition. As already explained, this inevitably
makes restructuring in favour of privatisation seemingly desirable. Behind
this work informed attempts unfortunately organised to focus solely on
aspects of allocative efficiency to justify the move. For example, there
are strong arguments that technological advancements (such as combined
cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants of smaller size and shorter gestation
periods) render the natural monopoly in generation sector irrelevant and
hence competition for allocative efficiency is possible in that sector –
both competition for market (initially in setting up plants, given a
corruption-free franchise bidding mechanism) and competition in market
(later on during operation, given a highly efficient ‘tatonnement’ agency)
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are postulated to be possible. The distribution sector, though  purely a
local monopoly, also is proposed to be  compatible with competition for
market. However, the invariable location specificity of plants other than
CCGT ones and the asset specificity in the transmission-distribution
sector still leave the system predominantly a natural monopoly and its
nationalisation does ensure increased gains in both equity and efficiency.36
It is at the cost of these gains and with higher (transaction) costs of co-
ordination and regulation that the hypothesised competition is being
sought.
The cunning generalisation of the experience of performance
disorders of some of the PSEs has been at the cost of the name of
other well-functioning ones. In the power sector itself, the National
Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) continues to be a star performer
by world standard.  The Maharashtra SEB (MSEB) had been
adjudged as a model for other SEBs in both physical and financial
performance till the entry of the Enron through the openings of
liberalisation. The MSEB’s encounter with the Enron illustrates the
potential disaster involved in the new policy (see boxes 2 and 3).
At the same time, this invalidates the already unfounded claims for
liberalisation as stemming out of a TINA force of economic
inefficiency; in fact the Enron a la liberalisation has been
instrumental in inducing systemic inefficiency into the MSEB.
Moreover, the glaring examples of the PSEs with golden track
records have already refuted such TINA force argument. And this
becomes evermore obvious as the Indian government is feverishly
engaged in selling out only the profit making PSEs, for example,
the Bharath Aluminium Company (Balco).  If privatisation is thus
resorted to not on account of economic inefficiency and out of a
relevant TINA force, then, naturally a possible explanation is to be
found in the vast scope for corruption in it.
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III
Concluding Remarks
As already explained, the socio-economic development India has
achieved over the last half-a-century owes largely to the commanding
heights of the public sector, even with all its failings and corruption
channels. If the vested interests were restrained and government
intervention moderated in its intentions, the sector could bear more fruits,
as expected in a poor developing country like India. When public sector
plays a crucial role (including in power supply) even in countries like
France, Canada and Scandinavia, in defiance of any TINA force, its
significance in poor countries goes without any argumentation. The
primary concern in these countries should then be to restore its relevance
to this sector, not to restructure it. In its self-rejuvenation, the public
sector can adopt and use certain functional/behavioural traits from the
private sector in a competitive environment of coexistence.
The private sector stands to sustain on account of its assignment-
specific accountability of each and every agent in terms of measurable
productivity. There is little scope for free rider plays in such arrangement
of return-related hire-fire rules. This along with an appropriate mix of
interactive policies of coercive compulsion and incentive compensation
can yield an efficient outcome to the desired degree, despite some covert
principal-agent problems. To the extent that such productivity-linked
labour contracts based on superior selection procedure have nothing to
do with the nature of property rights, there can be nothing to bar its
application in the public sector too, barring the absence of a strong
political will on the part of both the public and the government. This is
the sure recipe for an efficient public sector. After all, if the government
can relinquish its authority over public sector in favour of private parties,
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there is no reason why it cannot do that over its costly populist policies
in favour of an efficient public sector for the public good.
In concluding, let us re-stress the role of effective Government
intervention in the interest of common good. The emergence of
governmental authority in the history of the development of the social
relations of the mankind signified the significance of common good over
individual interests, though later on the institutional intention got tainted
by the power of private property rights. The enlightened rulers of the
ancients were expected to identify their own individual interests with
common interests and to rule accordingly. At a progressive stage of the
development of social history, even ‘the invisible hand’ of laissez faire
could be thought of having yielded, though initially only, the greatest
social benefit through individual pursuit of own interests. However, at a
reactionary stage, as we seem to witness now, the laissez faire of private
interests would only conflict and collide with each other under the ‘animal
spirits’ of a natural selection rule. Hence the need for government
intervention. This assumes added significance especially in a less
developed economy of majority poor. However, such ethical
commitments dry up under the hypocritical archetypes, ingrained in the
Indian subconscious mind, in league with the political economy of
corruption.  The future holds promises only with the rise of an enlightened
society out of a soul-cleansing cultural revolution, reminiscent of that of
the era of liberalism, having ‘a system of politics and administration
marked by a high degree of personal integrity’ (Myrdal 1968: 957).37
Along with the Santhanam Committee, we would like to add: ‘We are
convinced that ensuring absolute integrity on the part of Ministers at the
Centre and the states is an indispensable condition for the establishment
of a tradition of purity in public services. …..In the long run, the fight
against corruption will succeed only to the extent to which a favourable
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social climate is created. When such a climate is created and corruption
becomes abhorrent to the minds of the public and the public servants
and social controls become effective, other administrative, disciplinary
and punitive measures may become unimportant and may be relaxed
and reduced to a minimum.’ (Government of India 1964: 101-102). This
underscores the imperative for a vigilant civil society, fully conscious of
and committed to its duties and rights, to act as a watchdog in the common
interest. However, the emergence of such a civil society cannot be
spontaneous, but has to be striven for by conscious public praxis in toto.
Although we recognise the exertion of such public praxis by a few
concerned citizens and their organisations, the challenge is so enormous
that it calls for much greater intensification of efforts so as to eliminate,
at the least, the scope for rent seeking.
“Praja sukhe sukham rajna: Prajanam ca hite hitam,
Naatma priyam hitam rajna: Prajanam tu priyam hitam.”
- Arthasastra38  (1.19.34)
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Box  1
International Penetration of Corruption
According to the latest report of the Comptroller and
Auditor-General (CAG) of India, crores of rupees loaned by the
international lenders went down the drain as foreign consultants
were engaged in the country’s maiden power sector reform
launched in Orissa.
The consultants were appointed in violation of guidelines
and no attempt was made to engage domestic firms for the
purpose….
The report says that during the selection process, World
Bank’s senior energy economist virtually put pressure on the
government to opt for foreign firms, particularly KPMG, UK and
Arthur Anderson, USA, and sent the list for approval. The state
government agreed to the World Bank (WB) official’s suggestion
without enquiring into the firms’ experience and capabilities….
  The WB staff, in violation of the Bank’s own guidelines
and without any request from the government, also reviewed suo
moto the proposals submitted by the short-listed consultants and
took Rs. 2.2 lakhs as service charges. A consortium of consultants
led by KPMG was finally chosen with whom the  state government
entered into an agreement.
  The consortium’s work in the first stage was to formulate
basic strategies for carrying out the reform program which were
to be identified and implemented in the second stage for which it
was paid Rs. 41.97 crores. Despite extension of the deadline from
44 to 300 months, it could not complete its work, which got
extended to a third stage, costing the government an additional
Rs. 72.96 crores. The state government and WB did not have “a
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realistic perception of the requirement of the consultants’ time”,
the report observes.
Though the consultants were supposed to review and help
the state negotiate power purchase agreements (PPAs) and related
contracts for the privatisation of Orissa power generation
corporation, they claimed it as an additional work and took an
extra payment of Rs. 75 lakhs. They requisitioned, without asking
the government, a UK based firm, NGC, and billed an extra Rs.
35 lakhs.  The NGC’s system of load despatch, however, was
ultimately found not suitable for Orissa!
 Worse still, as per the CAG report, was the inability of the
state government to draft a legislation on reforms. The work was
entrusted to McKenna Company for Rs. 56 lakhs. Due to some
delay in establishing the project office and providing the necessary
office equipment, the consultants claimed, and were paid, ‘idle
time’ valued at Rs. 35 lakhs!………..
-Based on  The Times of India, July 17, 2000.
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Box   2
Enter the Enron…….
 Close on the heels of a tour to the USA in May/June 1992
of a team of government of India officials for inviting private
power producers to India, in the wake of the power sector
liberalisation move, an official team of Enron Corporation and
General Electric Company (GE) landed in New Delhi on 15 June
1992. They selected Maharashtra as their possible investment field
as MSEB was the only healthy Board in India.  So the team arrived
in Bombay on the evening of 17 June, and the following two
days they visited over half a dozen potential sites in the state.
And on 20 June, on the third day itself, the MSEB signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Enron and GE, by
which MSEB would buy electricity for 20 years at a price of US
cents 7.3 per unit (Rs. 2.34 per unit at then exchange rates) from
a LNG-run plant of about 2000 MW capacity to be built, owned
and operated by Enron near Dabhol.  ‘There is no explanation on
record or otherwise as to why a decision that involved the largest
series of payments in India’s history was taken do quickly’ (Mehta
2000: 21).
 It should be noted that the World Bank was not in favour
of this lop-sided contract. In its report of 30 April 1993, sent to
the finance ministry, the Bank, in reply to the MSEB’s request
for financial assistance for the project, concluded ‘that the project
is not viable’. In fact, Maharashtra, like the Northern parts of
India, had only peak load shortages of power and hence required
suitable peak load plants only. But Enron plant was designed to
be a base-load plant, which meant ‘surplus power in the off-peak
periods’, requiring closing down of some of the Board’s cheaper
plants.  ‘LNG generation at a variable cost of about  paise
150/kwh would displace coal-based power costing paise 30/kwh’!
Again, taking at its face value the unit cost of energy of US cents
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7.3 per unit as reported by the Enron, the Bank found that the
‘resulting retail revenue from LNG power would …. (be)….
Rs. 4.6/kwh in 1998 prices’, thus imposing high-cost power on
the consumers. Moreover, ‘implementation of the project would
place a significant long-term claim on India’s foreign exchange
reserves’ with the ‘estimated annual fuel cost’ being ‘about US$
500 million, subject to escalation’. Both the state government
and the Board tried their best to refute the Bank’s conclusions
and to justify the project, but the Bank remained unmoved. In its
final reply on 26 July 1993, the World Bank severely criticised
the MSEB’s attempt to justify the project on the grounds of a
‘more pessimistic’ projection of a decline in its own efficiency,
without taking measures ‘to reverse this projected deterioration’,
and declined to finance the project.
Central Electricity Authority (CEA) is the ultimate authority
in India to accord or refuse to accord techno-economic clearance
of a power project after examining the tariff and cost of the project
proposed and its consequences on the system. Though the MSEB
and the government of Maharashtra (GoM) of the Congress party
under Sharad Pawar, wanted to go ahead with the project without
waiting for the CEA procedures, the CEA intimated to the
government of India (GoI) of the same party (on 7 August 1992)
that its ‘concurrence under Section 31’ was ‘statutory’ and could
not ‘be dispensed with’. Then Enron submitted a technical report
of the project that in fact did not contain any information on many
essential parameters for evaluation such as cost components of
the project, rate of interest, etc. The officially advertised capital
cost of Rs. 9053 crores (about US$ 2830 million) gives Rs. 4.48
crores per MW (US$ 1.4 million) for the Dabhol plant. The CEA
from its study however found that the reasonable capital cost of a
similar combined cycle gas turbine plant would be Rs. 1.91 crores
per MW (completed costs by December 1997). It is interesting to
find that after five years, the ministry of power (MoP) officially
conceded in September 1997 to the CEA estimate. The CEA study
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also found that about 408 MW of MSEB’s generating capacity,
costing  50 paise to 80 paise a unit would have to be backed
down in the first year in order to accommodate 695 MW of Enron’s
power at the MSEB-calculated rate of Rs. 3.47 a unit, that
confirmed the World Bank’s warning about the Enron’s effect on
MSEB’s economic merit order system.
Enron simply refused to cooperate with the CEA by
furnishing relevant information it had demanded for examination.
In its final reply to the CEA on 11 October 1993, the company
stated: ‘It is important to note….that capital costs are irrelevant
to CEA’ [!] and ‘Your request  for more detailed project costs of
equipment/system/works other than those provided in the capital
cost summary cannot be supported and is not deemed
necessary.’[!]  Neither the government nor its bureaucracy was
of any support to the CEA; and the MoP informed the CEA on 11
November 1993 that ‘Finance secretary observed that the question
of cost of power had been looked into and it had been found that
it was more or less in line with other projects being put up in
Maharashtra.’ This in effect amounted to requiring the CEA not
to look into the financial aspects of the project. The CEA therefore
decided the next day itself ‘that given this background, the
completed cost would not be considered by CEA at a later stage’,
and that the project be given ‘clearance to technical aspects’ only.
While controversy still surrounds the actual date of technical
clearance by the CEA, the power purchase agreement (PPA) was
signed by the MSEB and Enron on 8 December 1993. The project
was to be implemented in two phases: only the first phase of 695
MW (to be run initially on naphtha) was binding on the MSEB as
per the PPA; the Board had thus option not to buy power from the
second phase of more than 1450 MW. The payments due from
the MSEB to Enron as per the PPA were guaranteed by the GoM
(on 10 February 1994) and counter-guaranteed by the GoI (on 16
September 1994). According to clause 11.2 (f) of the PPA, the
MSEB ought to pay the current month’s bill on a two-part tariff
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on or before the 25th  day of the following month. In case of a
default or delay in payment by the MSEB, Enron’s first recourse
is the irrevocable letter of credit against the MSEB’s receivables.
If the MSEB fails to pay, then the GoM is bound under its
guarantee to make payments within 7 days of invoking of the
state guarantee. If that too fails, then Enron can invoke the GoI’s
sovereign guarantee, in the event of which the Centre is entitled
to reappropriate the amount, paid by it to Enron, through state
devolutions that would in effect amount to cutting of assistance
to social sectors in the state.
 Meanwhile, the project had flared up much controversy
and the Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM) under the political
umbrella of the Siv Sena (SS)-BJP opposition in the state was
spearheading public agitation against the project. The SS-BJP
combine called the project a betrayal of the nation involving large
scale corruption and promised ‘to throw the project into the
Arabian sea’. This single issue brought them to power in the next
election in 1995. Immediately after the election and before the
alliance took over the reins of power, the caretaker Congress
government of Sharad Pawar, as asked by Enron, waived the
conditions precedent in the PPA, making the PPA contractually
binding and enforceable. A cabinet sub-committee constituted by
the new GoM on 3 May 1995 found that the previous government
had ‘committed a grave impropriety’ by conducting ‘private
negotiations on a one to one basis with Enron’ under
‘circumstances which made the Enron/MSEB arrangement on
Dabhol lack transparency’. The committee reached the ‘irresistible
conclusion’ on the issue of ‘whether undue favours and
concessions’ had been granted to the project, that ‘several unseen
factors and forces seem to have worked to get Enron what it
wanted’. The GoM then decided on 1 August 1995 ‘to scrap phase
1 and cancel phase 2 of the project’. The government also filed a
suit against Daphol power company (DPC) and MSEB in the
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Bombay High Court seeking cancellation of the PPA ‘on grounds
of fraud, corruption and misrepresentation’.
The estrangement, however, lasted only for two months.
Rebecca Mark, Enron’s CEO, met, on 7 November 1995,  Bal
Thackrey, ‘the self-proclaimed hand holding the remote control’
of the SS-BJP government of Maharashtra; and the very next day,
the government in a volte face announced ‘renegotiations’, despite
its umpteen promises of ‘no negotiations’. The government
appointed a committee in the name of ‘renegotiations’, but having
a mandate to ‘revive both phases of the project’, which the
committee fulfilled in 11 days. The renegotiated agreement
provided for an expansion of phase 1 capacity from 695 MW to
740 MW at no additional cost. Then on the Republic day of 1996,
the GoM formally announced the revival of both phases of the
project, thereby increasing the obligations of the MSEB to draw
full power from the project, i.e., from both the phases! And to
crown it all, the ‘swadeshi’ government of the BJP coalition at
the Centre cleared the sovereign guarantee to the ‘new’ project
on the last day of its legendary 13 day reign  in May 1996, just
before dropping the reins of government in the face of a vote of
confidence in the Lok Sabha. Interestingly, the new PPA was
signed after 3 months only, in August 1996, by the MSEB and
DPC, for the supply of over 2000 MW of electricity to the MSEB
for a period of 20 years.
‘The payments due on the renegotiated contract constitute
one of the largest contracts (civilian or military) in world history,
and the single largest contract in this country’s history. Payments
amount to about US$ 1300 million in the first year of phase 2 of
the project going on line. Total payments amount to about US$
35,000 million (Rs. 125,000 crores) over the life of the contract…..
a conservative low-end estimate of the net present value (NPV)
of this stream of payments is about US$ 17 billion (Rs. 70,000
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crores) to about US$ 23 to 25 billion (Rs. 1,00,000 to Rs. 1,06,000
crores) at the middle end.’ (Mehta 2000: 3).
 According to the MSEB’s own calculations now, when the
phase 2 project also is put on line, the power bill from the Enron
to MSEB would be Rs. 7000 crores a year, against the Board’s
anticipated revenue of Rs. 12,000 crores; i.e., the MSEB would
have to pay almost 60 per cent of its revenue for about 20 per
cent of its power purchase! A termination of the project would
cost the MSEB Rs. 35,000 crores by way of compensation to
Enron! (The New Indian Express daily,  2 January 2001). Today
the MSEB pays a capacity charge, that must be paid regardless of
the quantum of purchase as per the two-part tariff, of Rs. 93 crores
per month; this will go up to Rs. 230 crores a month, when the
phase 2 project also comes on stream! (The Hindu daily (Business
section), 21 December 2000).
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Box  3
The Enron Effects
The post-Enron period experiences have, however, painfully
proved the critics right. The developments have put all the parties,
government of Maharashtra (GoM), Maharashtra State Electricity
Board (MSEB) as well as government of India (GoI) and the
Enron, in a not unforeseeable quandary.
The first phase of 740 MW of Dabhol power project (DPC)
was put on line in May 1999 at an actual unit tariff of Rs. 3.37 per
kWh. This subsequently rose to Rs. 8.81 per unit in July 2000,
and has remained well above Rs. 7 per unit. The total payments
from the MSEB to Enron up to December 1999 were Rs. 1006.21
crores (Rs. 125.8 crores per month on average), and up to October
2000 was Rs. 2596 crores (Rs. 152.7 crores per month). MSEB
soon felt this monthly drain too depleting, and all hell broke down
there. The once-profitable and efficient MSEB found itself
reduced to an inefficient loser. On the other hand, DPC, as per
audited results, generated a cash profit of about Rs. 480 crores
during the first 11 months of operation (The Sunday Times  April
29, 2001). And the Enron project has come back in the hot news
again.
 Since June 2000, MSEB had failed to pay its monthly bills
to Enron on their respective due dates. It could not pay fully its
November 2000 bill for Rs. 198 crores even by January 2001.
According to clause 11.2(f) of the PPA, the MSEB must pay the
current month’s bill on or before the 25th day of the following
month. As the outstandings accumulated, MSEB requested GoM
for a subsidy of Rs. 130 crores per month to help it to meet its
obligations to Enron presently, and a monthly subsidy of Rs. 440
crores starting with the commissioning of Enron’s phase 2 project.
MSEB’s inability to pay the bills led to Enron’s resorting to the
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three-tired payment security mechanism one by one. First it
invoked the letter of credit and then the state government guarantee
and finally on 6 February 2001, the sovereign guarantee itself to
recover Rs. 79 crores dues for November 2000. The temperature
of the state of payments crisis was soaring up and the governments
were losing face and hearts as well. The Credit Rating Information
Services of India Ltd. (Crisil) downgraded the GoM by four
notches at one stroke to speculative grade. Finally on February
12, the MSEB cleared the entire November 2000 bill, out of ‘funds
made available by the state government’, without touching the
dues of Rs. 152 crores of December 2000 bill for which also
Enron had subsequently invoked the state government guarantee.
And in early March 2001, Enron again invoked the GoI’s counter
guarantee for a second time to recover the outstanding dues of
Rs. 102 crores towards the December bill.
The latest developments have, however, been more sordid.
As per the PPA, if the Dabhol plant fails to generate its maximum
capacity within three hours of notice, the Board can claim penalty
for the same. And so did the MSEB, slapping on March 1, a penalty
of Rs. 400 crores for a default on January 28; again MSEB recently
decided for another Rs. 400 crores penalty for a similar breakdown
on February 13. According to official reports, such breakdowns
are primarily due to the sub-standard project equipment used by
the Dabhol Power Company (DPC). However, the company found
it in its interest to deal with the situation by invoking, on April 9,
the ‘political force majeure’ clause of its PPA with the MSEB,
which meant ‘unforeseeable circumstances that prevent someone
from fulfilling a contract’. The notice indicated that the concerted,
deliberate and politically motivated actions of the GoM, GoI and
the MSEB had or potentially would have a material and adverse
effect on the DPC’s ability to perform its obligations under the
PPA. Significantly, the DPC invoked the force majeure clause
just one day before the Godbole Energy Review Committee
(constituted by the present GoM to scrutinise the Enron deal)
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submitted its report, which pointed out, inter alia, how Enron
had engineered to fleece the MSEB through the PPA ‘facilitated
by the failure of governance’ at every step of the decision-making
process related to the DPC matters. The Committee’s calculations
show that the DPC is overcharging the MSEB by Rs. 930 crores
per year, and compare this with its claimed equity of Rs. 3,500
crores! Evidently, the Enron wanted to evade and escape the hard
impact of the findings. Swift moves and counter-moves have
marked each day since then.
On April 25, the DPC Board of Directors that met in London
voted to opt out of the project, and authorised the DPC’s managing
director to issue a notice of intent to terminate its PPA with the
MSEB. The GoM on its part mandated a new Committee, again
headed by Dr. Godbole, to renegotiate a restructuring of the PPA,
and on May 5, the Company agreed to meet the state panel for
renegotiations. However, the DPC issued on May 19 a preliminary
termination notice in view of the failure of the MSEB to pay two
months’ dues and of the rebate (penalty) claim made by the Board.
And the MSEB, authorised by the GoM in turn, retaliated on
May 24 by issuing a notice to the DPC, to rescind the PPA, citing
misrepresentation by the latter on the performance capability of
the Phase I plant – the DPC had failed at least on three occasions
to deliver power at nameplate capacities within three hours of
demand by the MSEB. And since May 29, the MSEB has stopped
buying power from the DPC! Thus the game is on!
Noteworthy in this respect are the following strands of fall-
out from these sordid affairs:
1. The Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission
(MERC) directed MSEB to stick to the economic merit order
ranking of power plants: to buy or generate the least in terms
of the costliest power. Thus for the year 2000-01, the average
realisation for the MSEB was projected at Rs. 2.80 per unit
and energy costing more than this had to be purchased the
least. In the case of Dabhol power, the variable cost exceeded
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this average realisation mark in August 2000 and thereafter,
leading to the least off-take from the Dabhol plant. In effect,
the MERC pegged the quantum of power to be drawn from
Enron at 3044 MU for 2000-01, corresponding to 50 per
cent of its PLF.
2. The MSEB requested the GoM to keep on hold the two other
independent mega power projects planned in the state, viz.,
the Reliance’s 447 MW Patalganga project and the Ispat
Group’s 1084 MW Bhadravati project. Like the Enron
project, these too have a dollar payment component to their
cost. Moreover, the GoM made it clear that there would be
no Enron-type agreements in future: ‘We do not want to be
trapped into the clutches of MNCs and in future there will
not be Enron-type agreements’, so declared the Maharashtra
chief minister Vilas Rao Deshmukh (The Hindu 9 February
2001).
3.  Another important Enron effect is the GoI’s decision to drop
its proposal to offer sovereign guarantees to the three other
mega plants – the 3960 MW Reliance-SEAP promoted
Hirma project, the 1800 MW LNG-fired Ennore project and
the 2000 MW Pipavav project. (The government is in two
minds now about the need at all for setting up the Pipavav
project in Gujarat, following the CEA’s findings that once
the Hirma mega project is on stream six years from now, the
off-take of power from the Pipavav project would be only at
60 per cent of plant capacity. This means either down-sizing
the Pipavav project capacity or scrapping the project
altogether.) The government, instead, offered the option of
direct sale of power to earmarked consumers in the
purchasing states. This arrangement obviates the need for
the government to accord sovereign guarantee, necessitated
primarily on account of the financially fragile monopsonistic
nature of the power market (i.e., SEB). The Electricity Bill,
2000 also allows for direct sale of power to consumers. This
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provision, as argued elsewhere, by facilitating the weaning
away of a significant sure source of revenue (major
industries) from the SEBs would in fact only worsen their
position further.
The lessons from the Enron effects are obvious. Dabhol
power project in effect offered a monopoly market for the products
of its own owners – a LNG market to Enron, a gas supplier,
operating oil/gas fields; an electrical machinery market to General
Electricals, a supplier of power capital equipment; and a
construction market to Bechtel, a project engineer firm. These
three ‘suppliers’ possess the majority of stakes in the Dabhol
power company (DPC). Once the market was captured, they
managed to interpret the government notification on return on
equity in their favour to corner more than 30 per cent guaranteed
return also (Srinivasan 1996). Inefficient capital over-expansion
(Averch-Johnson effect/‘gold-plating’) is the empirically proved
behaviour under such conditions of guaranteed returns. With a
guaranteed high return (the highest in the world), what incentives
will a company get to minimise capital expenditure? It led  both
to accommodating all rent seeking costs in the project costs and
also to over-capitalisation, making power consumption in India
exorbitantly expensive.  The over-capitalisation behaviour, on the
other hand, is induced further by the guaranteed provision for
payments in dollar denomination. Given a historically weak,
submissive, rupee against dollar, nobody with a little sane
commercial sense would venture into a contract wherein the
payment for inputs (gas, machinery, etc.) were denominated in
dollars, while the output (electricity) was to be sold out at rupees.
When the project was contracted in 1993, the dollar, on its rising
trend, was quoting at Rs. 32.50, whereas at present it is around
Rs. 46.50!
All the Indian authorities concerned were not unwise to
this imminent danger that would make Indian electricity costlier.
For example, the MSEB’s letter (of 8 July 1993) to the energy
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secretary of the GoM, considering the effects of a range of
scenarios of escalations of exchange rate, capacity charge, oil
price, gas price, etc., shows full awareness of this on their part.
Despite this exercise, the MSEB wrote (on 30 September 1994)
to the energy secretary (GoM) that the Board ‘had already
examined the tariff structure of the Dabhol Power Company and
accordingly intimated the Central Electricity Authority …. [on]
September 17, 1993….that the tariff offered by M/s Enron is lower
than that calculated on the basis of two part tariff notified by
Government of India.’
 Nowhere else in the world is naphtha, the highly volatile
and costly fuel, used for power generation. Maharashtra had at
that time only peak power shortages, which could have been met
through import from the Central pool. The import price of naphtha
in January 1999 was Rs. 5,200 a tonne, which shot up to Rs.
16,000 a tonne by December 1999; today it is around Rs. 19,000
a tonne (Malayala Manorama daily 8 February 2001). The unique
Indian adoption of naphtha for power generation  was the offshoot
of a wrong forecast by the petroleum ministry of the domestic
availability of naphtha, expected to be in high surplus. The power
ministry based its entire liquid fuel policy on this forecast, and
suggested to Enron (as well as to NTPC) to turn to naphtha; Enron
had originally planned to use distillate in the first phase (The
Hindu Business line daily, 2 January 2001). Contrary to the
forecast, the domestic production of naphtha fell short, and at the
same time, the world price soared steeply up.
As a way out of the present impasse of payments crisis, the
GoM and MSEB have suggested that the Centre buy the entire
output from DPC directly or through NTPC, ‘pool its higher costs
with what is generated elsewhere and sell it to other deficit states’
(The Hindu daily, 8 February 2001). Simply it amounts to
spreading the heavy burden of Maharashtra’s own sin all over
the other deficit states!
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Notes
 1 Remember in a Smithian regime individual pursuit of self-interest
maximisation by itself results in public interest maximisation.
2 Equivalently, C(λq) < λC(q), λ >1 , for any q ≠ 0, where C(q) is
the total cost of producing q.
3 This is the condition of strict subadditivity of the cost function.
More formally, strict global subadditivity of costs for the multi-
product cost function C(q) implies that for  any m output vectors,
q1, …., qm,  C(q1 + ….+qm ) < C(q1) + ….+ C(qm), where
qi = (q1i , …., qni ) is the ith output vector.
4 The Chicago school view of interest group politics started with
Stigler’s (1971) discussion on the capture of regulatory authorities
by industries they were meant to regulate. Both Stigler and his
colleague Peltzman (1976) have built on the work of Olson (1965).
Becker’s model also is in the same grain except that he suppresses
the role of legislators, driven by the self-interest of maximising
political support. ‘Politicians, political parties, and voters  ….
are assumed mainly to transmit the pressure of active groups’
(Becker 1983: 372).
5 Tullock (1967) started the analytical discussion of rent seeking
in economics as a socially costly pursuit for income transfers,
though it was Kreuger (1974) who, unaware of Tullock’s work,
characterised the behaviour in the present terminology, in a
theoretical framework where rent seeking in the face of restrictive
policies in international trade results in social costs. Posner (1975)
was the first to develop a formal model of and to empirically
estimate the social costs of rent seeking, and the first survey of
the theory came form Tollison (1982). In the theoretical arena of
international trade, rent seeking appears in the form of tariff
evasion (Bhagwati and Hansen 1973), competition for premium-
fetching import licences (Krueger 1974), lobbying for
protectionist trade tariffs (Brock and Magee 1978) and for tariff
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revenue resulting from the adoption of protectionist tariffs
(Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1980), and so on. On the other hand,
rent seeking in the public choice theory represents competition
(e.g., lobbying) for monopoly rents (Tullock 1967) and for rent-
creating regulation (Stigler 1971), ‘rent-sharing’ by trade unions
through collective bargaining with rent-earning regulated firms
(Rose 1987), lobbying for and against a tax-financed transfer,
rent-seeking contract (for money, votes, etc.) by politicians
(Peltzman 1976) or just ‘rent-taking’ by them or rent extraction –
by threatening to extract private rents (e.g., through taxation) and
then refraining from doing so at a payment (McChesney 1987,
1997), and so on. Rent seeking can thus be extended to government
and bureaucracy too.
6 The term ‘principal-agent problem’ appeared first in Ross (1973).
The earlier discussion on principal-agent problem in the
framework of imperfect monitoring and imperfect information
appeared in Stiglitz (1975), Mirrlees (1976), Harris and Raviv
(1978), Holmstrom (1979) and others. For excellent surveys, see
Hart and Holmstrom (1987), Levinthal (1988) and Holmstrom
and Tirole (1989). It should be noted that the principal-agent model
was originally employed to analyse insurance, sharecropping,
physician-patient relation, law enforcement, etc. It was only with
the development of the model in the framework of imperfect
monitoring and imperfect information by Stiglitz and others that
the model was applied to analyse bureaucracies and hierarchies
of organisations.
7 The significance of the scope for collusive behaviour in the
principal-agent environment is explored by Tirole (1986) and
Laffont (1988, 1990).
8 Hence Samuelson (1970: 771) wrote: ‘through direct public
services and through transfer-payment programs, the modern
mixed economy is in effect a gigantic system of mutual insurance
against the worst economic disasters of life.’
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9 The KSEB has estimated that just two new industrial units (in
steel smelting and electro-chemicals) are drawing more than 8.7
MU every month at concessional rates. The tariff difference alone
gives them a benefit of about Rs. 30 crores a year, while the
employment generated is only nearly 350. That is, the KSEB is
forced to give a subsidy of about Rs. 8 lakhs per year for each job
thus created (Menon 1999:464).
10 For example, recently in a presentation to the union power ministry
on ‘measures to attract foreign direct investment in power sector
in India’, leading foreign financial institutions have required the
Central government to take measures to move the power sector
from the concurrent list to the Central list as in the case of the
Telecom sector (The Hindu daily 27 March 2001).
11 Note that the total  commercial loss in the sale of 293479 MU at
a cost-tariff deviation of 43.4 paise per unit in that year comes
out to be Rs. 12740 crores only, against this revenue loss on
account of corruption of Rs. 10705 crores.
12 Though theft of power has been made a cognisable offence since
1986 under the amended Electricity Act, 1910, collusion stands
to nullify its effect. All the SEBs do have anti-theft squads that
conduct regular but superficial homilies of checks and detect some
pilferage cases of small fry, just to justify the survival of the
squads. In 1997-98, the anti-theft squad of the KSEB detected
cases of theft of energy worth Rs. 1.21 crores, in 1998-99, worth
Rs. 1.04 crores and in 1999-2000, worth only Rs. 80.42 lakhs.
This steep fall in detection trend, despite an officially recognised
rise in theft losses, points to the need for vigilance over the
vigilante squad itself! The Board as well as the government keeps
the eyes closed and ejects some regular warnings and orders (just
to justify their own presence!) such as the one recently put out
again in vain by which each of the squads at centres of
Thiruvananthapuram, Kochi and Kozhikode is required to detect
cases of theft of at least 50 lakhs units a year (Malayala Manorama
daily 23 August 2000).
61
13 For example, Mehta (2000:10) cites a case from Maharashtra.
The Mula Pravara Cooperative Society is reported to have
outstanding dues of power bills to the Maharashtra State
Electricity Board (MSEB) to the tune of about Rs. 250 crores,
accumulated over a decade. The scion of the society had defected
to the Shiv Sena and was a minister in the Shiv-Sena- BJP
government last time. The MSEB still accounts for this amount
as ‘receivables’ and writes off a  fraction each year as bad debts.
14 The Santhanam Committee in its Report on Prevention of
Corruption remarked long back: ‘We were told by a large number
of witnesses that in all contracts of construction, purchases, sales,
and other regular business on behalf of the Government, a regular
percentage is paid by the parties to the transaction, and this shared
in agreed proportions among the various officials concerned. We
were told that in the constructions of the Public Works Department,
seven to eleven per cent was usually paid in this manner and this
was shared by persons of the rank of Executive Engineer and
below down to the Ministry, and occasionally even the
Superintending Engineer might have a share.’ (Government of
India 1964: 10)
15 The Santhanam Committee noted that ‘There is a widespread
impression that failure of integrity is not uncommon among
Ministers and that some Ministers who have held office during
the last 16 years have enriched themselves illegitimately.’
(Government of India 1964:101).
16 This was the first time that a court convicted a minister for
corruption in Kerala. The starting point was the detection of a
leak in the power tunnel of the Idamalayar hydro-power project
(that took 17 years for completion by 1987 with a cost escalation
of 387 per cent). Under pressure from the opposition parties in
the State Assembly, the then Congress-led Ministry instituted, on
21 December 1985, an enquiry commission  (The Justice
Sukumaran Enquiry Commission) to examine the allegations of
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corruption involving the then power minister, power secretary,
high officials  of the  KSEB, and the contractors. The Commission,
on the basis of detailed enquiry, indicted all of them on charges
of corruption involving huge losses to the exchequer. After a due
process of judicial trial, they all were convicted also. Subsequently,
there have been allegations, followed by enquiry commissions,
relating to the award of contracts in the construction of other
power projects also (for example, Brahmapuram diesel power
plant near Kochi). It should be added that the same minister along
with the officials were convicted in another case also – the
Graphite case that concerns illegal diversion for resale of NTPC
power to six companies in Karnataka including the Bangalore-
based industry, Graphite India Ltd., when Kerala was reeling under
unprecedented power shortage during the mid-eighties. These
private companies are alleged (in the FIR) to have profited to the
tune of Rs. 70 lakhs by way of getting the cheaper Kerala power.
17 The MoU for a 513 MW combined cycle power project at Kannur
at an estimated cost of Rs. 1500 crores was signed in February
1995 by the KSEB and the KPP Nambiar and Associates. It was
one of the nine mega projects cleared by the High Power
Committee (at the Centre) in 1995, when a Congress-led
Government was in power in Kerala. The power purchase
agreement (PPA) was signed on March 14, next year, and by the
end of 1997, the Kannur project was accorded techno-economic
clearance (TEC) by the CEA.  But the project was an ill-starter.
The new left Government in Kerala could not tolerate the Enron
co-sponsorship of the project and hence rejected the  state
clearance to the project. However, after some dilly dallying, the
government agreed to clear the project(the Chairman of the
company being a close relative of the Chief Minister!)  provided
it found a new co-developer acceptable to the state government.
Thus a  new Kannur Project was then recommended by the state
government with the El Paso Energy International of the US as
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the co-promoter.  Kannur power project was one of the three
projects in the power sector (including the NTPC-Birla sponsored
1886 MW Ennore power project in Tamil Nadu  with 100 per
cent foreign (US) participation) identified by the Union
Government to be presented at the Indo-US summit in Washington
to attract US investment to India during the recent visit by the
Indian Prime Minister there. But the state electricity minister
called the joint secretary in the Union Power Department, on the
eve of the PM’s visit to the US and said, “We have decided in
favour of Ennore and not Kannur”  (The New Indian Express
daily, September 20, 2000). The Kannur project is pictured as the
most recent victim of inner party factional frictions as well as
unrequited kickback demands (The New Indian Express,
September 28, 2000). The Chairman of the company himself has
recently come out and reported to the Press of the kickback
demands for Rs. 75 crores by the son of a political bigwig
controlling the government. The El Paso co-sponsorship of the
project also has been recently rejected by the government.
18  This has been at the tragic cost of the domestic producers of
power generating equipment, especially Bharat Heavy Electricals
Ltd. (BHEL), which, being up to mark technologically and much
cheaper, has gained good markets in some of the developing
countries. Till the late seventies, the BHEL had won nearly all
international tenders floated in India for power equipment (Mehta
2000: 15). However, its share in the capacity addition in thermal
sets in India has recently come down to the order of 50 to 60 per
cent: ‘BHEL itself has repeatedly stated that the single most
important handicap it faces in India is its inability to arrange for
kickbacks’ (Morris 1996: fn. 15, 29).
19 The Brahmapuram project, the first thermal power plant of the
KSEB (and the second diesel power plant in the country, the first
being the Yelahanka project in Karnataka) of 100 MW capacity
was implemented with French assistance of Rs. 160 crores loan
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under the Indo-French protocol. The Justice V. Bhaskaran
Nambiar Enquiry Commission has found that the purchase
contract with a French company SEMT Pilistik for five generators
(each of 20 MW) without calling for international tenders as per
guidelines resulted in a gain to the French company (and a loss to
the KSEB) to the tune of Rs, 71 crores, that the contract with Geo
Tech for land reclamation and levelling led to a loss of Rs. 2.96
crores, and that the contract with Tata Project for generator
erection works involved a loss of Rs. 1.38 crores. The files in the
government and the Board, examined by the Commission, were
clear proofs for the high powered collusion that had gone out of
their way to favour the contractors (various dailies 12 April 1999).
Diesel, a highly expensive fuel like naphtha, is not at all permitted
by the Central government in power generation. The KSEB has,
however, now two diesel plants – at Brahmapuram (100 MW)
and at Kozhikode (120 MW). These two plants have often been
run much below capacity, sometimes at not more than 30 per
cent, because of the high operating costs, much more than Rs. 5
per unit, greater than twice the cost of imported energy from the
Central pool. It is estimated that to run a generator at
Brahmapuram for 24 hours requires about 120 kilo litres of diesel
worth Rs. 9 lakhs, whereas its energy fetches less than  Rs. 5
lakhs only. This then involves a loss of about Rs. 20 lakhs per
day to the Board from the Brahmapuram plant alone. Hence it
has been decided to run the diesel plants only during the peak
load hours. The same peak load could, however, be met by cheaper
power from the Central share with a judicious import policy. A
simple lesson from this then is that the KSEB could safely have
dispensed altogether with the costly diesel plants and saved
substantial resources.
20 In this context, Morris (1996: fn. 29) writes: ‘From other sources
we know that for a small favour of a year or so’s extension, a
former chairman of the NTPC had to arrange for a contribution
of a crore of rupees to the Congress [party] kitty. Thus even the
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task-oriented enterprises within the PS [public sector] necessarily
have to accommodate corruption. (The state of affairs in
enterprises that have veered too far from their primary task can
well be imagined.)’
21 A high Level Committee even went to the extent of recommending
to the government of Kerala long back to enact ‘appropriate
legislation prohibiting strikes under any circumstances in all
power projects under construction’, especially citing a ‘classical’
example of three strikes by the construction workers of a project
(Idamalayar hydro-power project, works on which started in 1970
but completed only in 1987) that extended over a total period of
three years and one month, causing a loss of Rs. 33.65 crores to
the KSEB (Government of Kerala 1984: 57-61).
22 Excluding  the hydro projects of Kallada and Pooyankutty, and
the two diesel power plants. If we stick to the strict assumption
that the original project cost estimate allow for possible inflation
during construction period, such that the estimate be as on the
completion date, then the corruption charges involved would be
very much higher.
23 Interestingly, in an advertisement by the Public Relations
department of the KSEB announcing the commissioning of the
Kuttiady extension project claimed it to be ‘the first project to be
completed on time in a span of 25 years’ (various dailies 26
January 2001), whereas in fact  the project, major works on which
were started in February 1994, was originally scheduled to be
commissioned in 1995-96, thus involving a time overrun of about
5 years and a cost escalation of more than Rs. 160 crores. Again,
the advertisement put the project cost at Rs. 160 crores, while the
latest cost estimate is given at Rs. 198 crores by the Economic
Review 2000. Even at the advertised capital cost, the energy
potential of 129 MU from the project cost as much as Rs. 12.4
per unit!
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24 Rose-Ackerman (1999:28-29) quotes a number of cases of
corruption-inflated project costs: for example, Itaipu dam on the
Brazilian border. In the 1970s, two German companies reportedly
paid bribes of 20 per cent of the value of construction contracts
for a steel mill in Indonesia to a state government official. In
Germany, in the mid 1990s, bribes played a major role in awarding
contracts to build Terminal 2 at Frankfort Airport; according to
the public prosecutor, corruption led to an increase in the air fares
of about 20 to 30 per cent. In Italy, the costs of several major
public construction projects reportedly fell steeply after the anti-
corruption investigations of the early 1990s. Overall successful
bids on public tenders were reported to be 40 to 50 per cent lower
in 1997 than five years back.
25 Another possible explanation for this divergence is that while the
CEA has been giving original cost estimates, the MoP has been
reporting the final estimated costs, after allowing for overruns.
But as we have already argued, overruns are often deliberate and
conceal corrupt collusion.
26 Examples come galore in India in this respect – the revelations of
Harshad Mehta, the bull instrumental for the great stock market
crash in India, about his crores worth bribes to the Congress party
kitty through the then prime minister (PM) during the early 1990s,
confession of a Jharkhand Mukthi Morcha MP of having been
bribed by Congress party by crores of rupees for voting in favour
of its PM in the face of a non confidence motion in the Lok Sabha
(the very same PM was convicted in this case),  the recent
allegations by the chairman of Kannur Power Projects about the
demand for a bribe of Rs. 75 crores for sanctioning the power
project by a Marxist bigwig’s son wielding full power in the power
ministry of Kerala, etc.
27 The absence of relevant files would also prove the cases (!) as it
has so happened in the case of the Graphite energy resale cases in
Kerala. There has not been a single official paper in the Board or
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in the ministry regarding the energy export to Karnataka; the
matter came into light when the Karnataka SEB wrote to the KSEB
about the energy sales later on!
28 A former chief secretary of Kerala, when convicted recently in a
corruption case, reportedly simply quipped: ‘No problem; there
are higher level courts!’
29 While enlarging upon the need for Indian economy’s restructuring,
the World Bank (1996: 3) had to recognise, though in passing,
that ‘India’s pre-1991 planned development strategy helped the
country escape from the massive illiteracy, recurrent famines,
fertility rates of about 7 children per woman, and secular
stagnation prevailing before Independence.’
30 See, for a comparative analysis of corruption levels across
countries, World Bank (1997). Corruption in the trasition
economies is explained among others by Boycko et al. (1995),
Feige (1997), Kaufman and Siegelbaum (1997), Malia (1995)
and Weisskopf (1992).
31 According to Quinglian (2000), what has occurred in China since
1978 as a result of what she calls ‘the marketisation of power’
has been nothing but a ‘socialist free lunch’ by which the
politically powerful in China have used their still awesome
administrative and personal power to plunder the former state-
owned economy and ‘laugh all the way to the bank’!
32 To be precise, the changes in India were not political and
institutional, but were in the ruling economic principles.
33 See Thakur (1979) for a detailed discussion on corruption in the
ancient India. Myrdal (1968 Chap. 20) gives a good discussion
on corruption in modern India, extensively quoting from
Santhanam Committee Report (1964).
34 For one example, the Committee (Government of India 1964:18)
found that import licences in India were worth 100 to 500 per
cent of their face value!
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35 ‘Where there is power and discretion, there is always the
possibility of abuse, more so when the power and discretion have
to be exercised in the context of scarcity and controls and pressure
to spend public money.’  (Government of India 1964: 9)
36 Remember, in a country like India, rich with hydro-power
potential, a judicious hydro-thermal plant mix in generation
capacity, along with considerations of high-cost gas power vis-à-
vis cheap and clean hydro-power can ensure this for a long time.
37 The Santhanam Committee (1964) long back recognised that
ministers and legislators must be above suspicion and proposed
codes of conduct for these two categories of politicians and special
procedures for complaints against them. Accordingly, on 29
October 1964 itself, the Government of India released the text of
a code of conduct for ministers both at the Centre and in the states.
The code required disclosure by a person taking office as minister
of the details of his and his family’s assets and liabilities as well
as business interests.  He was also required to sever all connections
with the conduct of any business. However, the scepticism
expressed at that time itself on the loyalty on the part of the
intended persons to the codes of conduct has proved right. Myrdal
in 1968 itself wrote: ‘Later, the eagerness for reform seems to
have died down. The reports are that corruption in India has
recently been increasing.’ (p. 956, fn. 2)
38  “In the happiness of the subjects lies the happiness of the king;
in the welfare of the subjects is the welfare of the king; what is
desirable and beneficial to the subjects and not his personal desires
and ambitions, is desirable and beneficial for the king.”
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